Sudan Policy

Committee on International Relations
U. S. House of Representatives

Robert B. Zoellick
Deputy Secretary of State

June 22, 2005

January 1, 1956
Line of
Demarcation

SUDAN

Goals of U.S. Policy

- Unified, peaceful Sudan that contributes to regional development and cooperates on counter-terrorism.

- Participatory and inclusive democratic government in federal system that respects human rights, and shares resources for the benefit of all Sudanese.
  - Successful, free, fair, and democratic elections at the local, regional, and national level within four years.

- An end to violence in Darfur, reconciliation among tribal and other groups, the voluntary return of people to their homes, and accountability for the perpetrators.
  - In the meantime, humanitarian care and security for IDPs and other civilians in Darfur and Chad, and security of operations for NGOs and international donors.

- Full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) between North and South, improving conditions in southern Sudan.

- Economic development and effective integration of all areas of Sudan into the global economy.
  - Ending the recurring cycle of famine and suffering, cross-border violence, and refugee flows.

- Strengthened African Union capacity to provide basic security, ensure humanitarian access, and mediate political conflicts, drawing on success in Darfur and all of Sudan.

- Demonstration of strong U.S. support for Africa's peaceful development and democracy.

Background and Context

- Sudan has been marked by ethno-religious exclusivism since Khartoum traders and mercenaries carved out a state through conquest in the Nile Valley in the 19th Century.
- Historically dominated by a small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators.
  - Drawn from tribes along the Nile north of Khartoum.
  - Arab cultural and religious orientation; links to Cairo, Damascus, Saudi Arabia.
- Khartoum has been an Arab metropolis surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses.
  - In the South, a traditional African tribal structure (animist and Christian communities).
  - In the West, in Darfur, a mixing of African-Arab Muslim tribes which have come over centuries in waves: West Africans on long migrations (and trade routes); ancient Saharan peoples; and Arab tribes from the North.
    - Mixture of nomads and farmers, complex networks connected to desert-edged villages, very dependent on rain-fed (boom and bust) agriculture and grasses.

- – In the North, a mixture of Arab tribes (comprised of Nubians – a significant minority group) predominate in the urban areas.
- – In the East, generally egalitarian, pastoral Beja with ancestral ties to Egypt and Nubians.
- In the past (until 1989), a weak center in Khartoum co-opted regional constituencies to create a power base.
  - – Independent Fur Sultanate (of 17th century) of Darfur overthrown by the British in 1916.
  - – Imperial "native administration" awarded homelands with paramount chiefs, displacing older, more fluid social order. (Some nomadic groups didn't get lands, lighting a long fuse for the future.)
  - – Rule depended on effectiveness of local leadership and government.
  - – Tribal conferences as a means to settle disputes.
- Sudan achieved independence from Great Britain in 1956.
  - – Largest country on the continent.
  - – Borders nine other countries.
  - – Estimated 40 million people in 2005.

- Roots of conflict
  - Strong resentment from the periphery of Muslim Arab domination at the center – southern groups commence struggle coincident with independence in 1956.
  - Peace agreement in 1972 failed because it was not fully implemented; GOS imposed Shari'a Law in 1983; southern civil war resumes under the leadership of Dr. John Garang, a southerner who had been integrated into the GOS military during the 1972 peace implementation.
  - First use of government-mobilized militias in the South as a counterinsurgency strategy in mid-1980s, drawing on cattle-herding Arabs of Darfur (reliance on brutality, starvation, and robbery).
  - An estimated two and one-half million die in conflict that stretches across 21 years.
- Darfur in conflict in the mid-1980s
  - Drought and famine of 1984-85 - breakdown and migration.
  - In 1987, Libya used the region as a "backdoor" into Chad.
  - "Arab Legion" and a new racial ideology ("Arabism").

- In 1989, General Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew the government and established the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan. The National Islamic Front, led by Dr. Hassan al Turabi, took over as the leading party.
- Hyperinflation of 1978-95 wipes out Sudan's traditional middle-class.
- Turabi prosecutes a vicious war in the south; reaches out with Islamic embrace in Darfur, but without real effect on development.
- In 1992, declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against SPLA-led Nuba Mountains rebellion; failed effort to create Islamic state through force.
- In 1998, army, militias, and starvation used in oilfield zones of Upper Nile province in southern Sudan; battle over money and power, not Islam.
- During 1990s, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden.
- U.S. attack on a suspect WMD production facility possibly linked to al-Qaida in Khartoum, August 1998.
- In 1999, split within Islamic movement in Khartoum: President Bashir arrests Turabi.

- After September 11, 2001, the GOS accelerates reorientation toward the U.S.
  - Bashir fearful of Sudan's association with terrorists.
  - GOS cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily.
- Politics driven by exhaustion - worn down by decades of war, failure of ambitious ideological projects - led to North-South Accord (Comprehensive Peace Agreement-CPA) signed in January 2005.
  - New pattern of power-sharing among geographically-defined constituencies.
  - Prospects for development (in part through energy) with greater international acceptance.
- Outside Khartoum, the impulse for equality and emancipation pulls in opposite directions: Should the peripheries win strongest possible representation at the center to obtain fair share of power and resources, or should they break away?

- Khartoum's old habits - and fears of separation – are also in tension with the negotiated power-sharing.
    - In 2002, some Darfurians complained of Arab militia harassment; the problem festered and the rebels attacked a police station in 2003.
    - Even as Khartoum negotiated with the SPLM in the south (starting 2002), it unleashed the army and a brutal militia counterinsurgency in Darfur in 2003.
    - Some in Khartoum believe CPA negotiation gives away too much.
    - Large loss of life, widespread rape and destruction of villages, over two million forced from their homelands. Violence carried out by government forces, Arab militias (Jinjaweed), SLA, and JEM.
    - Some Darfur rebels (SLA) have ties with SPLM.
    - U.S. finds genocide has occurred in Darfur (September 9, 2004); UN rules "crimes against humanity" (January 2005).
- Dangers elsewhere in Sudan: Eastern and Northern provinces as well as Kordofan.
    - Need to try to prevent flare ups of violence.
- Strong African interest to: avoid destabilization of 9 neighbors; prevent possible breakups of states; demonstrate the African Union's ability to deal with African problems.

The Naivasha (North-South) Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

- Begun in 2002, signed in January 2005.
  - U.S. mediation vital, led by Senator Danforth.
- A fair political arrangement founded on power and wealth sharing, leading to national elections within 4 years.
  - Very detailed implementation requirements.
  - Commitments to develop Interim Constitution, bicameral national legislature, process for competitive elections, new Institution of Presidency, allocation of ministerial posts, oil-revenue sharing, joint-integrated units, human rights provisions.
  - Pre-Interim period scheduled to be completed by July 9, initiating new Government of National Unity for 6-Year Interim Period.
  - South can "opt-out" through referendum at end of 6-Year Interim Period.

The CPA and Darfur:
Reinforcing Upward, Arresting Downward Spirals

- The CPA creates a political and constitutional framework for sharing authority and wealth within which to end the conflicts in Darfur and other regions.

- Garang and SPLM involvement in the new Government for National Unity should also help resolve Darfur.

- Backing by the U.S. and countries around the world creates a positive incentive to come to terms.

- So the "upward spiral" is CPA implementation, a new Sudanese government and approach, an expanded AU mission on the ground, and reconciliation in Darfur (and other areas) within this political framework.

- But ongoing tragedy in Darfur will preclude U.S. and other support for the new government and CPA implementation: the "downward spiral."

Darfur's Needs

- Supply food and basic necessities to camps for people forced off lands (some 2 million); improve security inside and outside camps; foster political reconciliation among the government, rebel groups, and various tribes; and redress long-term economic and social issues driving conflict.
- Drought exacerbating human needs, increasing displaced populations.
- Food flowing: AID has done a great job along with NGOs.
  - 86% of food delivered in Darfur thus far has been supplied by the U.S.
  - GOS and rebels must halt NGO harassment.
- The AU has agreed to expand its security forces from 2,700 to 7,700.
  - NATO/EU to provide transport, logistical, planning support.
  - Deployment aimed for July – September.
  - Expanding AU police operations to about 90 camps. Need to stress safety of women.
  - GOS supported AU/NATO role.
  - US: Airlift for Rwandans; visited Rwanda to discuss and thank; $50 million deployed promptly to build quarters; assistance with AU planning and logistics.

- GOS military pulled back, but Jinjaweed and militias still operate (appears to be less violence, but increased banditry according to the UNSYG report).
  - U.S. helped head off individual conflicts.
- Rebels (SLA/JEM) still active; fighting each other.
  - JEM connects with Turabi, the former Prime Minister.
- AU peace talks between GOS and rebels begun in Abuja.
  - Important for the AU to lead.
  - U.S. supporting through work with UN representative, partner countries for AU, Dr. Garang and SPLM, U.S. officials on the scene.
- UN resolutions on economic sanctions and accountability signal no impunity for crimes against humanity or genocide, by any party.
- Goal is to create secure environment and political, tribal reconciliation so people can voluntarily return home safely.
  - Disarm militias.
  - Still face huge challenge of restarting life, redressing issues of land, grazing rights, and water.
  - Tribal tensions due to land, drought, new settlements will remain – conflict among tribes over local resources.

CPA Follow-Through

- Oslo Donors Conference:
  - $4.5 billion pledges (for CPA implementation and humanitarian needs throughout Sudan); need delivery
  - U.S. (for all of Sudan): $630 million in FY 2004: $1.089 billion in FY 2005, plus additional $132 million CIPA; seeking $540 million in FY 2006, plus additional $250 million CIPA.
- UNSC Resolution 1590 on March 24 authorized 10,715 observer force for southern Sudan.
  - Deployment started in May 2005; aim for completion by December 2005.
  - U.S. maintained Civilian Protection Monitoring Team; excellent monitoring work.
- Food shortages for returnees and displaced persons.
  - U.S. providing 90% of food delivered to non-Darfur Sudan.
  - Serious situation in Bahr Al Ghazal, North Kordofan, Nuba Mountains, and elsewhere.
- Press GOS to work with SPLM and Uganda on Lord's Resistance Army (in far south).

- Working with Government of Southern Sudan to set up basic institutional capabilities:
  - Sent Interagency Assessment Team.
  - Total of $19.68 million in FY05 for programs to assist the formation of the GOSS.
  - Need to show progress in the south.
- Pushing both GOS and SPLM on CPA implementation in an inclusive fashion (to include other groups).
- Urging formation of Government of National Unity by July 9 goal.
  - Need to work with GONU through the challenging transition.
- Support safe and voluntary return of displaced Sudanese.
- Encourage GONU to improve international acceptability.
  - Especially Darfur, handling of IDPs and refugees.
- Encourage new policies at national, local, and provincial governance; promoting security and community-level conflict resolution; economic development; and health and education.
  - GOS needs to cease destruction of IDP camps near Khartoum.

In Summary

- Need to work with Sudan on multiple transitions:
  - War to peace.
  - Centralization to genuine federalism – devolution of power.
  - Emergency to development.
  - Military rule to democracy.
- Upward or Downward Spirals.
- Working closely with AU.
  - Multilateral diplomacy with particular African partners; the UN; Arab states; UK, Canada, Norway, Netherlands; NATO; EU; others
- Two visits to Khartoum, different parts of Darfur, Rumbek in southern Sudan.
  - May return for July 9 creation of Government of National Unity.
- Will need Congressional support and resources.
- Not a smooth, nor clear-cut path.
- Must concentrate on both achieving accords and implementing them – lots of detailed work.

# AMIS Locations (Current and Planned) in Darfur as of June 20, 2005

LEGEND:

- Current Camp (red)
- Airport
- New Camps for Expansion (blue)
- AMIS HQ (star)

Map of UNMIS Sector Allocations

Funding FY 2004-FY 2006

**U.S. Assistance to Sudan/Chad
(excluding Assessed Contributions)**

in Millions

|	Darfur/Chad	Other Sudan
FY 2004	$332.56	$307.90
FY 2005	$608.92	$479.62
FY 2006 Request/Estimate	$206.00	$334.40

In addition, U.S. contributions to UN Peacekeeping for Sudan: FY05=$132M , FY06=$250M.

Darfur/Chad: Humanitarian Aid
FY 04 - FY 06

FY 2005 Supplemental includes $240 million in PL 480 for Sudan and other parts of Africa. USAID is determining how much is to be allocated to Sudan.
Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from regional and global accounts. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs.
Food and disaster numbers could change depending on appropriation level and needs during FY 06.

Darfur/Chad: Non-Humanitarian Aid FY 04 - FY 06

FY 2005 Supplemental includes $240 million in PL 480 for Sudan and other parts of Africa. USAID is determining how much is to be allocated to Sudan.
Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from regional and global accounts. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs.

Sudan (non-Darfur): Humanitarian Aid
FY 04 - FY 06

Legend:
- Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
- Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)
- PL 480 Title II Food Aid (estimate)
- Int'l Disaster Assistance (IDFA)

In Millions

	FY 2004 ($218.70)	FY 2005 Total ($280.68)	FY 2006 Estimate ($197.00)
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	$11.00	$33.00	$22.00
ERMA	$2.70		
PL 480 Title II Food Aid	$155.00	$146.00	$50.00
Int'l Disaster Assistance (IDFA)	$50.00	$101.68	$125.00

Final amounts depend on assessment of need and appropriation.

FY 2005 Supplemental includes $240 million in PL 480 for Sudan and other parts of Africa. USAID is determining how much is to be allocated to Sudan.
Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from regional and global accounts. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs.
Food and disaster numbers could change depending on appropriation level and needs during FY 06.

Sudan (non-Darfur): Reconstruction and Other Non-Humanitarian Aid FY 04 - FY 06

FY 2005 Supplemental includes $240 million in PL 480 for Sudan and other parts of Africa. USAID is determining how much is to be allocated to Sudan.
Some accounts in FY 2006 are estimates based upon allocations from regional and global accounts. Emergency resources are allocated against emergency priority needs.